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Na IO's southern flank, extending from the Iberian peninsula in the western 
Mediterranean to Greece and Turkey in the east, rarely receives the attention 
that its strategic importance deserves The Mediterranean to which the southern 
flank is exposed links 100 million peoples, upwards of 1200 vessels daily ply 
its waters, over 5U percent of Europe's energy is supplied by countries 
bordering the southern Mediterranean, trade and economic exchange are critical 
to the economic health of regional states, and the armed force strength of the 
littoral states total over three million
The significance of the southern flank and the problems it poses for the 
security, economic well-being, and political stability of the alliance may be 
viewed from three progressively larger perspectives one successively 
encompassing the other the military balance between NATO and WARSAW Pact 
forces, the requirements of alliance cohesion as a prerequisite for NATO use and 
access to the strategic assets of the region, and the national conflicts, civil 
strife, religious and ideological clashes and socio-economic change sweeping 
over the peoples of the littoral states of the southern Mediterranean —  
conditions that invite the disruption of critical energy resources flowing to 
the West as well as foreign intervention and Soviet expansionism
The East-West Balance on the Southern flank
The geo-strategic conditions of the southern flank contrast sharply with 
NAIO s central front In the central region, the armies of the two alliances 
are directly arrayed against each other NAIL) and Warsaw pact forces occupy
2established positions and are assigned similar roles They are supported by an 
elaborate logistical infrastructure as well as transportation and communications 
networks that have been extensively developed over J5 years The Soviet threat 
is clear and present Except for France, other NATO partners are integrated 
into an over-all plan for the use of allied forces against a possible Warsaw 
pact attack
fhe stability and settled expectations of the central front are absent on 
the southern flank The Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat appears less imminent and 
dangerous to the southern NATO states beset by their own quarrels and mternalk 
divisions The expanse and widely varied terrain of this region create discrete 
strategic problems for the NATO states, three distinct theatres of operations 
can be identified In the west, Spain and Portugal protect the western-most 
redoubt of the alliance's defense line In the middle lies Italy In the east, 
Greece and Turkey share responsibility for the eastern Mediterranean 
Communications and joint planning between these theatres is fragmented and 
uncoordinated
The Mediterranean imposes still other security requirements not found on 
NAfO s central front Lines of communications must be kept open across the 
broad expanse of the Mediterranean which links, as it has for over two millenia 
the peoples of Europe with those occupying the southern littoral These bonds 
of time and circumstance throw into serious question whether the sector 
mentality currently dominating NATO thinking can be maintained Threats to NATO 
countries arise not only from the confrontation with the Warsaw Pact but from 
sources deep within the political and socio-economic structure of the peoples 
inhabiting the southern Mediterranean 1
JAt first glance, it would appear that the military balance of Last-West 
forces on the southern Hank, is at least as favorable as on the central front 
Figure 1 compares NATO and Warsaw pact land and air forces m  both theatres On 
the central front, l b NAiO divisions face 5/ Fact divisions whereas ..he ratios 
are slightly more advantageous to the West on the southern tier where the 
balance is respectively J7 to I V  divisions Brigade and regimental strength 
favor the central front Tank, imbalances are particularly noticeable in the 
center where the ratios are more than three Lo one in favor of Communist bloc 
forces In the south, they are closer to two to one Artillery and motor 
balances are again more favorable in the south than m  the center On the 
central front, the ratio is roughly two and a naif to one against the alliance 
while m  the south one can count on a rough parity ¿ Gross ratios conceal 
serious imbalances in certain sectors m  the south While Greece and Turkey 
together have 4,000 tanks and 4 oOu artillery pieces they confront Pact and 
boviet forces with 11,000 tanks and H  J00 artillery pieces The geography of 
northern Greece and Turkish Thrace is also suitable for armored offensive 
operations capable of being reinforced by amphibious forces
Ground force ratios of southern flank 'front line' NATO members directly 
opposing Warsaw Pact states vary Light Italian divisions tace 10 boviet and 
Hungarian divisions illese Pact forces could be reinforced by another seven 
divisions which currently are not maintained at a high state of readiness 
Three airborne, air mobile, and assault divisions ean also be added to these 
elements Against Turkish and Greek forees the Warsaw Pact deploys 4 boviet 
Romanian and Bulgarian divisions An additional ¿0 boviet divisions could be 
committed against eastern Turkey ^
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4Numbers do not tell tne whole story Greek, and Turkish forces are 
particularly vulnerable The defensive operations of Greek and Turkish forces 
are complicated by the narrowness between their borders (Thrace) and the Aegean 
(jO-bO miles in width) Resupply would be difficult because of Soviet 
land-based aircraft and bolstered naval forces concentrated in the area 
Turkey's northern border with the Soviet Union stretches J8U miles over rugged 
territory favorable for defensive action Both Greece and Turkey, however, 
sorely lack modern weapons and support equipment These include anti-tank 
weapons, attack helicopters, radar, command, control, and communications 
systems, and air defense missile systems Their M-47 and M-48 tanks, the 
mainstays of their armored forces, are considered antiquated 5 some material 
dates back to World War il Economic constraints slow modernization 6
Ihe picture in Italy is better In contrast to Greece and Turkey, its 
forces are closely integrated into NATO planning Its tank forces are equipped 
with 920 Leopard I battle tanks and its artillery and armor are being 
progressively modernized Italy has also developed a modern weapons complex and 
has the technical infrastructure to place its forces at a level of operational 
readiness on a par with the states of the central front
The land forces of Portugal and Spain are more oriented toward central 
front operations Portuguese forces suffer from equipment and support 
deficiencies Spain's military role is m  doubt its forces are outside NATO's 
integrated framework A pending referendum is to decide whether Spain will 
remain within the Atlantic Alliance Except for a Portuguese brigade earmarked 
for northern Italy,8 the Iberians are not likely to provide major reinforcements
to the other southern flank states
5JLhe air balance particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, prompts 
concern The central front ratio of three-to-two m  favor of Warsaw Pact air 
forces is closer to two and a half to one in tne south While NA10 and Warsaw 
Pact forces deploy approximately the same numbers of attack, aircraft, boviet 
interceptors outnumber NATO aircraft by a five-to-one ratio (1560 to 295)
Warsaw Pact forces appear to be in a strong air defense posture They utilize 
Su-15s, MiG-2Js, MiG-25s and Yak-28Ps, these are supported by Tu-12b airborne 
warning and control systems Perhaps up to 100 Tu-26 Backfires and additional 
Tu-22 Blinder bombers can also be deployed against NATO ground and naval forces 
These forces are supplemented by an impressi/e air transport capability and over 
two thousand helicopters  ^ Libyan bases may also be available to the Soviet 
Union in a crisis Access to them and to Soviet combat aircraft m  Libyan hands 
would outflank. NATO naval forces and place the Sixth fleet at risk
Greek and Turkish air forces will be hard pressed to cope with their Pact 
counterparts Much of the aircraft available to Athens and Ankara is over 
twenty years old Turkey's f-100s, a Korean War vintage aircraft, is obsolete 
while its F-104 fleet is quickly approaching the same state While it has 
approximately 168 F-4s and F-5s, these forces are far from being fully 
operational As one analyst observes, 'fewer than one-half of Turkey s planes 
are combat ready, spare parts inventories are low or non-existent, and many 
planes have been cannibalized for parts, pilot training, consequently, has been 
limited ' It) Greece is not in much better shape It deploys A-7s, F-lU4s, and 
f-5s as attack aircraft and F-4s, F-5s, and French Mirage F-is as interceptors 
Both seek F-16s Turkey may have to settle for F-5s (with funds to be supplied
by baudi Arabia) Greece is negotiating for F-16 and Mirage 2000s
6Only Italy is moving toward rapid modernization with the introduction of 
tne multi-purpose Tornado into its inventory The Portuguese air force is very 
small and not consequential as a combat or air defense force Spain has 
attempted to keep more abreast of modernizing trenas although its forces also 
need upgrading Currently its forces comprise six interceptor squadrons of 
F-4s and trench Mirage Js and newer F-is
For NATO to hold the Mediterranean, there is a need for close cooperation 
of air and naval units through the region A satisfactory air defense system 
has yet to be achieved either between national air and naval forces or between 
NATO-designated units The states of the southern tier are focused on their own 
theatres NATO's air forces on the southern flank have not resolved three 
essential problems command and control at an all-theatre level, in tune of 
crisis, rapid absorption of national units into NATO's command structure, and 
smooth and workable coordination between air, ground, and sea commands
The naval balance in the Mediterranean is paradoxically, both unsettling 
and reassuring Gone is the monopoly once enjoyed by the Sixth fleet The 
Soviet Union has steadily built a formidable Baltic Sea fleet and Mediterranean 
squadron They are now capable of challenging NATO control of the Mediterranean 
in wartime They already project Soviet naval power beyond the coastal limits 
of the Soviet Union to which Moscow's naval forces were previously restricted 
They underwrite Soviet diplomacy in the region and bolster Moscow's ties with 
its clients Soviet vessels have important base rights in Syria at Latakia and 
Tarsus They also have repair, maintenance anchorage privileges m  Yugoslavia,
Greece, Libya and Algeria
7Figure 2 summarizes Soviet naval capabilities m  the region The Black Sea 
fleet is composed of three aircraft carriers (one VTOL and 2 helicopters), 25 
attack submarines, 77 combat ships (9 cruisers, lb destroyers, and 52 frigates 
and corvettes), and 25 amphibious ships It can also deploy 90 bombers and 20 
fighter-attacK. aircraft fhe Mediterranean squadron provides a Russian constant
presence capable of exploiting the troubled political waters of the region
Offsetting Soviet naval power are combined NA10 forces, including the Sixth 
Fleet which has been stationed m  the Mediterranean since the late 1940s NATO 
forces are clearly stronger than their Soviet counterparts The Sixth Fleet 
commands three aircraft carriers (two with 115 attack aircraft and a third for 
helicopters) These are complemented by 6 attack submarines, 14 combat ships (3 
cruisers, five destroyers, and o frigates), and 4 amphibious ships fhe
combined forces of Greece, furttey, Italy, and Spain count 43 submarines, 308 
combatants, and two helicopter carriers If trance is added, alliance forces 
have access to 2 aircraft carriers, 9 submarines, 21 combat ships, and three 
support ships ^  The three principal choke points in the Mediterranean —  the 
Dardanelles, Suez, and Gibraltar —  are m  the hands of friendly powers 
The Soviets have apparently assumed a defense posture m  the region 
relative to NAfO forces Increases in Soviet naval power in the late 1970s have 
been earmarked for the Pacific and Atlantic fleets while the Fifth hskadra m  
the Mediterranean and the Black Sea Fleet have remained at approximately the 
same size Soviet naval power is suited to the active defense strategy designed 
for these forces and the diplomatic role m  which tney have been cast They are 
a useful instrument of Soviet political penetration and, if necessary, a visible 
military presence During the Yora Kippur war the Fifth Eskadra was expanded to 
96 units During the recent Lebanon crisis, Soviet naval power in the
«Mediterranean was estimated at 45 units ^
MAIO"s naval torces sufficiently counterbalance Soviet naval power to raise 
questions as to whether the American profile might well be lowered m  order to 
bolster Atlantic fleet deployments supporting NAfU s northern defenses without 
reducing the diplomatic and symbolic functions of American naval presence in the 
Mediterranean Several benefits might flow from a concentration of American 
naval forces in the Atlantic first elements of the Sixth fleet could fulfill 
their mission of supporting tne central front more efficiently tnan being tied 
to the Soviet land mass that abuts the Mediterranean through the Turkish 
straits Currently naval attention is often more focused on deploying ships 
and air squadrons to relieve those on duty with the Sixth Fleet than in 
supporting air and ground forces in the southern theatre for the Atlantic 
fleet. Sixth fleet deployments as one informal oDserver notes, has become 
'employment ends in themselves, driving the entire operating cycle of ships ano 
squadrons ^
Second, the Sixtn Fleet is ill-suited to address the internal political and 
economic problems that beset the region which are the principal sources of
NAiO's security problems It cannot arrest change in the region The 195«
?
Lebanese intervention had no lasting favorable result More recently, while 
Sixth fleet strikes against rebel forces had no impact on the Lebanese civil 
war it caused needless civilian casualties and damage and provoked widespread 
resentment among Moslems against the United States American forces also come 
dangerously close to engaging Soviet personnel assisting Syrian defense forces 
The Sixth fleet s marine contingent became more a target tnan a deterrent Lo 
local terrorism as some ¿50 Marines needlessly lost their lives m  a doubtful 
political operation, ending in the ignominious retreat of U S forces
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9Third the Europeans would have a role that would match their interest and 
capability They have a greater interest than the United States in keeping 
Middle East oil flowing to their industries Their naval presence in the 
Mediterranean is established by obvious security and economic interests and 
honored by established historical preceaent Their knowledge of the region and 
access to all of the peoples inhabiting the area is as good as that of the 
United States lhe French, british, and Italian units distinguished themselves 
for bravery and tact during the Lebanon crisis An enlarged European military 
and political presence, to match Europe's economic dependency on the region, 
might be coaxed into being and imployed as a more effective instrument of 
western aims and interests than it has been until now Meanwhile, if needed, 
detachments of the Atlantic Fleet could be quickly dispatched to the 
Mediterranean to bolster NATO's posture
Finally, a heightened European role m  the Mediterranean might ease 
strained U S relations with Greece The Papandreou government makes much of 
the distinction between NATO and American purposes m  access to Greek bases 
This distinction might well be crystallized m  an agreement between NATO and 
Greece to preserve these rights while Athens and Washington quarrel over their 
differences
NATO Access to the Strategic 
Assets of the Southern Flank
Whether NATO will have access to the strategic assets of the Mediterranean 
may well depend more on resolving disputes within its own camp than on the 
cooperation of the Soviet Union The major problem is Turkish-Greek enmity, 
rooted in centuries of strife, sustained by mutual suspicions and bitter
lü
recriminations Today differences center principally on the future of Cyprus as 
well as sea and air rights in the Aegean Neither NATO nor the United States 
has been able to resolve these disputes Only a stern warning from President 
Lyndon Johnson of dire consequences restrained Turkey in 1964 from invading 
Cyprus to protect the rights of the Turkish settlement which makes up twenty 
percent of the island's population In 1974 Turkey ignored warnings from 
Washington and invaded Cyprus in response to a coup d'etat engineered by the 
Greek junta to overthrow the Makanos government Turkish forces gradually 
extended their control over JU percent of the island They have remained on the 
island ever since despite efforts by NATO and the United States to reach a 
political settlement on a new Cyprus government and a withdrawal of Turkish 
forces The dispute took another bad turn in November 1983 when Rauf Denktash, 
leader of the iurkish minority, declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
as an independent state The action violated U N resolutions calling for the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus What began as a temporary 
invasion to protect Turkish Cypriots risks being transformed into a permanent 
division of the island and Greek-Turkish hostility would be further 
institutionalized
American dandling of the events before and after the Turkish invasion have 
prompted both Greece and Turkey to blame the United States for the imbroglio and 
the slow movement toward a settlement Its credibility as a mediator has been 
seriously compromised in both camps The arms embargo passed by Congress m  
1975 to punish Ankara for violating American domestic law and accords with 
Turkey designed to preclude the use of U S equipment for invasion purposes, 
inflamed rather than calmed the Turkish government Washington appeared to side 
with Athens The resumption of arms assistance in 1978 and the U S Turkish
11
Defense Agreement of 1980 helped somewhat to improve relations, but resentments 
over bruised national feelings still run deep within Turkish ruling circles and 
public opinion The self-imposed 7-to-lU ratio of arms assistance, 
respectively, to Greece and Turkey grates on the Turks, who believe fneir 
critical geographic position and material contribution to NATO defenses warrant 
greater understanding and more generous assistance In a reversal Ankara now 
warns Washington against another resort to an arms embargo to discipline Turkey 
Turkish Defense Minister Haluk Bayulken put the United States on notice that the 
'Turkish people will not tolerate another set of pressures like the arms 
embargo '16
The Greek government and people have been no less disenchanted with 
Washington The Kararaanlis government which replaced the Greek colonels 
withdrew Greece from NATO within hours after the Turkish invasion Failure to 
stop Turkey was laid at Washington's door for having ignored the island s 
problems while implicitly siding with Turkey on the issue Whatever the merit 
of Karamanlis' change, it responded to popular feeling in Greece across the 
political spectrum Nationalistic sentiments of the Right and Left were united 
on the Cyprus issue The Left further accused the United States not only ot 
supporting the army dictatorship but ot instigating the coup attempt ot 
Makanos NATO, the United States, and the Greek colonels were identified as 
acting in collusion by Leftist partisans When Greece returned to the NATO 
military organization m  1980, it placed several conditions on its reintegration 
into the alliance Prominent among them is its insistence on the prior 
recognition of the status quo ante before the Turkish invasion before it would 
consent to the full establishment of the Greek NATO headquarters in Larissa
12
Both Athens and Ankara have attempted to widen their diplomatic stances and 
reduce their dependency on Washington Since both view the other as its 
immediate security threat the Soviet Union appears less torbiddmg Over the 
past decade Turkey has steadily increased its trade with the Soviet Union It 
is today one of the Soviet Union's major trading partners A 1982 accord 
envisions a one-third expansion of trade levels Soviet aid to Turkey also 
compares favorably with what is given other Third World states
Greece, too has multiplied its ties with the Soviet Union Like Turkey, 
efforts to increase trade with the Soviet Union and Warsaw bloc were launched, 
resulting m  greater Greek imports of oil from the East In 1979, Soviet
commercial and auxiliary combat ships were granted access to repair facilities 
on the Island of Syros These contacts were further strengthened in 1983 by the 
visit of Soviet Prime Minister NiKolay Tikhonov to Athens and the signature of 
long-term agreements m  economic, industrial, scientific and technical areas 17 
Playing the role of Romania within the Western camp also suits the popular 
Socialist government of Andreas Papandreou whose PASOK party was re-elected to 
office in 1983 The Papandreou government has adapted what its leader calls a 
more independent and multi-directional policy " Greece is "'striving for 
friendly relations and the development of cooperation with all countries, 
irrespective of their bloc membership '* ^  This stance had led Athens to 
distance itself from its western allies on the Polish, Afghan, and the Korean 
airlines crises During Tikhonov's 1983 visit, the Greek government signed a 
joint communiqué underlying the importance of nuclear-free zones as a 
disarmament measure The Papandreou government also cntized the deployment of 
Pershing II and cruise missiles Greece has refused, on at least one occasion, 
to sign the usual joint communiqué after a NATO ministerial meeting to draw
13
attention to Greece's demand for a security guarantee against possible Turkish 
aggression ^  More recently, tempers have flared between Athens and Washington 
over the Pentagon's charge that anti-American sentiment aroused by the 
Papandreou government was partially responsible for the February 2 terrorist 
bombing of the U S Air Force installation at Hellenikon near Athens in which 57 
Americans were injured at a bar ihe Reagan administraion also looks askance at 
the Papandreou regime's pursuit of agreements with Communist Albania, Bulgaria, 
and Yugoslavia and its alignment with the Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi ^
A long, festering dispute between Athens and Ankara over sea and air rights 
m  the Aegean bea further deepen the fissures opened by the Cyprus question 
witnin the alliance and between Washington and its east Mediterranean allies 
Greece claims rights to continental shelf exploration for hundreds of its 
islands in the Aegean sea, many which are near the Turkish mainland Turkey 
maintains that the Aegean Sea presents unique problems which cannot be resolved 
by strict application of international law precedents, including the 195Ò Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf ratified by Greece in 1972 but not by 
iurkey The Turkish line is a median strip through the Aegean seabed between 
the mainlands of the two countries The Turkish position would place much of 
the eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese Islands within the Asia Minor continental 
shelf and thereby restrict Greek prospecting rights All these claims would be 
moot were it not for the discovery of oil m  the northern Aegean and natural gas 
off the west coast of Thasos
Both countries have bolstered their military installations to counter each 
other In the wake of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Greece fortified several 
islands near the Turkish coast The Turks countered by establishin0 a nuliLary 
headquarters at Izmir for its Fourth Army On several occasions over the past
decade Che cwo countries have come close co armed blows over Turkish exploration 
ships sent to the area The Greeks tear that acceptance of the lurkish line 
would isolate the 3JU,0U0 Greek inhabitants of the Greek archipelago and 
legitimate the installation of Turkish economic and security zones in the seas 
around tnese islands Turkey is also concerned about the possibility that 
Greece might extend its territorial waters from six to twelve miles, turning the 
Aegean into a Greek sea
The discord over sea and resource rights is joined to still another over 
air rights Until the Turkish invasion, Greece was responsible for civilian and 
military air traffic control over almost ail of the Aegean After the Cyprus 
takeover, Turkey unilaterally pushed the reporting line westward to widen its 
intelligence network to warn of an impending Greek attack After 19/5 Turkey 
also refused to respect the 10 nautical mile airspace zone previously fixed and 
acknowledged by the Greek government 21
Unless the Cyprus and air-sea rights disputes are resolved, Greece and 
Turkey perceive each other as greater threats to their security than the Soviet 
Union 22 The strategic assets of these two states are focused elsewhere than on 
the Warsaw Pact Moreover, NATO and American access to Greek and Turkish bases 
is jeopardized Major installations used by U S forces include Hellenikon air 
force base, Nea Makn communications station near Marathon Bay, Iraklion air 
station and the Souda Bay complex on Crete and communications and air defense 
sites spread through Greece 23
Turkey also affords an array of critically important military bases, 
intelligence sites, and command and communications centers These include the 
Incirlik and Cigli air bases Iskenderun and Yumurtalik supply depots, the 
Kargabarun LORAN installation that assists U S military air and sea craft to
15
fix their positions, and air force support bases at Ankara and Izmir on the 
west-central Aegean coast of Turkey With the loss of Iranian bases, Turkish 
intelligence sites are especially important for collecting data on Soviet space,
missile, and systems development related to the SALT agreement and SlART
talks 24
Both countries have renewed base agreements in the 1980s The Papandreou 
government threatens, however, to end all base access by 1988, a move that has 
wide popular appeal Bolh countries are dissatisfied with what they believe is 
the inadequate compensation that they have received for their bases and the 
level of annual military assistance that they have been granted Comparisons 
with aid to Israel and hgypt, neither of whom are NATO members, are invidious 
Military officials from both countries as well as Italy and Portugal complained 
to a House panel that while NATO states on the southern tier were accorded $772 
million in IY 1983 of which $67 million was on a grant basis, Israel and bgypt 
received $3 8 billion of which $2 3 billion was on indirect grants 25
Barring another mishap or crisis, like the 1974 iurkish invasion chere is
still time to find ways to relax if not resolve Greek-Turkish differences This 
will require a more active diplomacy than that which has characterized either 
NATO or American efforts Drift is likely to be the enemy of stability For 
the moment both the Papandreou government and the Ankara regimes have incentives 
to stay within the alliance Leaving an integrated NATO or the western alliance 
would weaken Greece's diplomatic moves on the Cyprus or sea-air rights issues 
Denying Greek bases and facilities would also hurt Papendreou's program to pull 
Greece out of its economic doldrum As a fillip, there are electoral benefits 
to be gained by attacking American imperialism and by blaming Washington for 
Greece's economic plight Many of these same incentives to keep within NAIO but
lb
to distance Ankara from Washington impact on the iurkish Government Ihere is 
the added consideration that Turkey shares a long border with the Soviet Union 
and would be in the first-line of attacx if hostilities should erupt How to 
innoculate Turkey from the religious Islamic fervor sweeping the Persian Gulf 
and the Middle hast is also a concern The Turkish government nas reason to 
preserve its ties to the West as a buttress for Turkey's secular regime but its 
problems in dealing with its Islamic neighbors and extremists at home will have 
to be better understood m  Western circles than they are now if Ankara is to 
walk a careful line between its external Western orientation and its domestic 
Islamic predisposition
A word might also be said about the special problems attending Spanish 
entry into the Atlantic Alliance Its membership is threatened by a promised 
referendum on the question, raising the prospect of serious damage being done to 
Western cohesion and defenses as a consequence of its possible withdrawal 
Spanish entry into the Atlantic Alliance was pressed through parliament by the 
Central Democratic Union which was subsequently defeated by the Socialists and a 
left-of-center coalition vocally opposed to joining the Western alliance in the 
absence of a national referendum The Socialists have still not followed up 
tneir call for a referendum which, if it had been called upon their entry into 
office, would almost certainly have produced a "no" vote on Spanish 
participation
Those favoring NATO participation argue that Spain should join the open 
societies of the alliance as part of a larger strategy, including membership m  
the European Community, to reinforce Spain's fragile democratic institutions 
through association with the Western states The armed forces would be focused 
on the Soviet threat abroad rather than self-styled concern tor Leftist security
17
threats at home Many would like to push Spam toward a European defense 
framework within NATO and away from the bilateral arrangements reached with the 
United States over base rights
Those opposed to NATO entry are still suspicious of NA10 and, specifically, 
perceived American collusion with the Franco government The base accords with 
the franco regime lent legitimacy to an otherwise isolated government These 
past resentments are linked to present concerns about Spanish assumption of 
strategic and political commitments that are not in Spain's interest There is 
also the risk that it will have to spend more for defense although its 
unemployment rates are among the highest in Europe
NATO countries worry, too, about the problems Spain brings to the 
organization Domestic instability and retarded economic growth are potential 
burdens for alliance members Integrating Spain into NATO's structure poses 
problems of sharing command responsibilities, particularly between a wary Lisbon 
and a suspicious Madrid, long-time Iberian competitors The Gibraltar issue 
will inevitably be drawn into NATO discussion The Spanish enclaves of Ceunta 
and Mellila m  North Africa can bring NATO into an unwanted dispute with 
Morocco Differences between NATO and Spam over the alliance's air defense 
network have already arisen Spain wants NATO to include Cuenta and Mellila in 
its coverage, Brussels is reluctant to include these Spanish outposts from a 
concern over the possibility of an incident with Morocco or other North African 
states In sum, while Spanish withdrawal would be an embarrassment for the 
West and a plus for Soviet diplomacy bought at almost no cost, Spanish entry and 
integration is not an unmixed benefit 26
Id
The Southern Flank, and the Southern Mediterranean
The Southern flank, threatened with division between its members and 
domestic disarray, is exposed on the southern Mediterranean to the armed 
conflicts, political turmoil, ideological struggles and socio-economic change 
convulsing the region Certain strategic facts appear evident first as Curt 
Gasteyger reminds us, there is a "growing predominance of domestic problems over 
external ones "27 The warring peoples of the region see their neighbors as
greater threats than the Soviet Union Iraq, Syria, the PLO, and Libya actually 
view Moscow more as a help than a hindrance in achieving their security goals 
Second, the United States cannot count on its NATO allies to support its 
unilateral initiatives in the region The Lebanese multilateral force was an 
exception and it collapsed under stress The temporizing of the European 
states over Afghanistan, the Iranian hostage crisis, the Yom Kippur War and the 
associated objection and downright denial of American access by the Europeans to 
their bases and military supply depots suggest that American planning should not 
be based on the expectation of European solidarity with the United States in 
responding to Persian Gulf and Middle East crises
Finally, the direct use of American military power in the area, now focused 
in the organization of the U S Central Command (uENTCOM), appears unrelated to 
most of the security threats facing the region and in potential conflict with 
strategies calculated to preserve and expand American and western interests
19
The Soviet Union preys on the divisions ot cue region it cannot be heid 
primarily responsible for them, however tempting that rationalization might be 
The Iranian Islamic revolution grew out of deep opposition to the rule of the 
Shah, to his alliance with the United States and, more profoundly, to secular, 
modernizing trends challenging Islamic fundamentalism and the mullahs directing 
its political expression ine Persian Gulf war is heir to the religious 
fanatacism inflamed by the Khomemy regime m  Iran and the misguided territorial 
appetite, and personal aggrandizement of the Hussein government in Iraq The 
Iraq-Synan conflict arises out ot competition between rival factions ot the 
Ba'ath party for dominance m  each nation and the search for an ascendent 
position m  the Persian Gulf and the Middle Last We need no instruction about 
the local roots of the Arab-Israeli war, nor about the sources of communal 
rivalries wracking Lebanon nor about home-based urges driving Syria's 
imperialistic ambitions m  the region The Qaddafi regime's support for 
terrorism is long-standing Its interventions into Egyptian, Sudanese, North 
African, and Chadian politics are more easily explained as a consequence of the 
pretentions of tne Libyan leader than as responses to soviet direction 
Similarly, the Moroccan claim to the western Sahara precedes by centuries the 
formation of the Soviet regime, the continued fighting by Polisano rebels is 
sustained more by the determination of Algiers and Tripoli than by Moscow
it should also be recognized that the Soviet Union is not viewed with the 
same suspicion as the United States or former European imperial powers Iraq 
and Syria however much they differ, depend critically on Soviet military 
assistance Libya's armed forces are equally dependent on Soviet arms as are 
those of Algeria and South Yemen It is also interesting to note that the 
largest commercial arrangement between the Soviet Union and a Third World state
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is with Morocco, a project principally keyed to the exploitation of its 
phosphate reserves Arab states and the PLO count on Soviet diplomatic support 
to sustain their claims m  their conflicts with Israel, with each other, and 
with the western allies, particularly the United States
No less should it be overlooked that after over thirty years of superpower 
tests ol will m  the region, one can discern the slow crystalization of 
established patterns of superpower behavior and even of common interests in the 
region Moscow cannot be locked out of the Mediterranean basin It has 
established itself as a major player, a fact of life that Washington has 
gradually, if reluctantly, had to accept Second, both have learned to act with 
caution and reserve to prevent a major military confrontation Third each in 
its own way has an interest in controlling its clients and in implicitly 
assisting its superpower opponent m  controlling its respective clients 
Neither has an interest in an Iranian victory m  the Persian Gulf For 
different but parallel reasons, Islamic fundamentalism must be contained For 
the Soviets it raises domestic problems and poses a threat to the expansion of 
its influence in the Moslem world For the United States the Iranian virus 
poses a threat to the unvexed flow of oil and gas from the region and a danger 
to moderate Arab regimes and Israeli security So unlikely a state as Iraq has 
the tacit backing of Moscow and Washington in its war with Iran In Lebanon, 
the U S counts on Syria to put a damper on the civil war and to limit 
terrorism In North Africa, both superpowers compete for favor with Algeria 
which buys arms from the Soviets but trades its gas and oil to the United 
States Both superpowers also are props for the Hassan II regime m  Morocco 
Moscow through economic concessions, Washington through economic and military
aid
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This sketch is not meant to suggest that a U S Soviet condominium is 
imminent in the Mediterranean It accents more the complexities of 
Mediterranean politics and the importance of diplomacy, economic aid and 
political compromise in pursuing Western aims over the application of American 
military force as a substitute for subtle maneuvering and flexibility In tms 
connection, the Arab tilt of the southern NATO states may be a potential asset 
in maintaining the dialogue with the Arab states and in containing Soviet 
influence while, paradoxically, attempting to tame and temper Soviet behavior as 
a cooperating competitor in the area The American contribution is to 
underwrite Israeli security and to support moderate regimes, particularly the 
oil producing states and c.gypt The latter s recognition of the Israeli regime 
and abandonment of belligerency in the Camp David accords opened the way for 
peaceful management of Arab-Israel differences This approach serves as a model 
for possible relaxation, if not resolution, of the long-festering Palestinian 
issue
American experience m  using military power lo advance western interests 
has been sobering fhe recent Lebanese intervention was a disaster and the 
withdrawal a humiliation The credibility of American arms and political 
support were hardly bolstered by the quick reversal of position, first 
supporting an independent Lebanon and then abandoning it to civil war 
Stationing troops in the region provokes local resentment and undermines 
friendly regimes, like Oman and Saudi Arabia, that the U S  is ostensibly 
attempting to protect The search tor bases drives strategy rather than the 
reverse To protect advanced positions political commitments will have to be 
made with shaky regimes whose reliability is doubtful Witness the reversal of 
alliances in the Horn of Africa Ethiopia is now a client of the Soviet Union,
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Somalia whose port at Berbera is part of the Lí S Central Command's base 
structure, is in the American camp The U S Central Command (CENTCOM), is 
ill-suited to meet even those contingencies that may have a military dimension 
It faces three uncertainties troop limits, transportation and invitations from 
beleaguered allies Exposed to an inhospitable political climate and far from
sustaining logistical support, it is difficult to see how CENICÜM could prevent 
a determined Soviet armed attack A Soviet-Amencan military clash would be 
tantamount to the Fashoda incident between England and trance at the turn of the 
century Containing the war to tne Middle East, an exposed Western salient, is 
not likely to succeed and, it contained American military forces would be 
poorly positioned, with little likelihood of local support, particularly from 
the Arab states
Working with the conflicting groups and political cross-currents cutting 
through the southern Mediterranean would appear to be a better course to follow 
than seemingly simple but potentially mischievous military solutions to the 
region's rivalries The United States (and tor that matter the Soviet Union) 
has neither the military resources nor political will to impose its rule on the 
region To an appreciable degree Western security interests, economic needs, 
and Israeli independence depend on skillful management —  and manipulation —  of 
the divisions animating the politics of the southern Mediterranean Similarly, 
active American and European cooperation, principally within the Atlantic 
Alliance and the European Community, are indispensable for the end of the 
Greek-Turkish Cold War A political cohesive southern flank is a precondition 
for a solid central front and stability in the East-West competition
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